Measuring Trust: Experiments and Surveys in Contrast and Combination

Trust is a concept that has attracted - significant attention in economic theory and research within the last two decades: it has been applied in a number of contexts and has been investigated both as an explanatory and as a dependent variable. In this paper, we explore the questions of what exactly is measured by the diverse survey-derived scales and experiments claiming to measure trust, and how these different measures are related. Using nationally representative data, we test a commonly used experimental measure of trust for robustness to a number of interferences, finding it to be mostly unsusceptible to stake size, the extent of strategy space, the use of the strategy method, and the characteristics of the experimenters. Inspired by criticism of the widespread trust question used in many surveys, we created a new, improved survey trust scale consisting of three short statements. We show that the dimension of this scale is distinct from trust in institutions and trust in known others. Our new scale is a valid and reliable measure of trust in strangers. The scale is valid in the sense that it correlates with trusting behaviour in the experiment. Furthermore, we demonstrate that the test-retest reliability of six weeks is high. The experimental measure of trust is, on the other hand, not significantly correlated with trust in institutions nor with trust in known others. We therefore conclude that the experimental measure of trust refers not to trust in a general sense, but specifically to trust in strangers.Trust, experiment, survey, representativity, SOEP

Measuring Trust: Experiments and Surveys in Contrast and Combination

Trust is a concept that has attracted significant attention in economic theory and research within the last two decades: it has been applied in a number of contexts and has been investigated both as an explanatory and as a dependent variable. In this paper, we explore the questions of what exactly is measured by the diverse survey-derived scales and experiments claiming to measure trust, and how these different measures are related. Using nationally representative data, we test a commonly used experimental measure of trust for robustness to a number of interferences, finding it to be mostly unsusceptible to stake size, the extent of strategy space, the use of the strategy method, and the characteristics of the experimenters. Inspired by criticism of the widespread trust question used in many surveys, we created a new, improved survey trust scale consisting of three short statements. We show that the dimension of this scale is distinct from trust in institutions and trust in known others. Our new scale is a valid and reliable measure of trust in strangers. The scale is valid in the sense that it correlates with trusting behaviour in the experiment. Both survey and experimental measure correlate with related factors such as risk aversion, being an entrepreneur or a shareholder. Furthermore, we demonstrate that the survey measure's test-retest reliability (six weeks) is high. The experimental measure of trust is, on the other hand, not significantly correlated with trust in institutions nor with trust in known others. We conclude that the experimental measure of trust refers not to trust in a general sense, but specifically to trust in strangers.representativity, survey, experiment, trust, SOEP

The Role of Equality and Efficiency in Social Preferences

Engelmann and Strobel (AER 2004) claim that a combination of efficiency seeking and minmax preferences dominates inequity aversion in simple dictator games. This result relies on a strong subject pool effect. The participants of their experiments were undergraduate students of economics and business administration who self-selected into their field of study and learned early on that efficiency is desirable. We show that for non-economists the preference for efficiency is much less pronounced. We also find a gender effect indicating that women are more egalitarian than men. However, perhaps surprisingly, the dominance of equality over efficiency is unrelated to political attitudes

The Role of Equality and Efficiency in Social Preferences

Engelmann and Strobel (AER 2004) claim that a combination of efficiency seeking and minmax preferences dominates inequity aversion in simple dictator games. This result relies on a strong subject pool effect. The participants of their experiments were undergraduate students of economics and business administration who self-selected into their field of study and learned early on that efficiency is desirable. We show that for non-economists the preference for efficiency is much less pronounced. We also find a gender effect indicating that women are more egalitarian than men. However, perhaps surprisingly, the dominance of equality over efficiency is unrelated to political attitudes.Social Preferences; Inequity Aversion; Efficiency Preferences

Commodity-specific punishment for experimentally induced defection in cooperatively breeding fish.

Coercion is an important but underrated component in the evolution of cooperative behaviour. According to the pay-to-stay hypothesis of cooperative breeding, subordinates trade alloparental care for the concession to stay in the group. Punishment of idle subordinates is a key prediction of this hypothesis, which has received some experimental scrutiny. However, previous studies neither allowed separating between punishment and effects of disruption of social dynamics, nor did they differentiate between different helping behaviours that may reflect either mutualistic or reciprocal interaction dynamics. In the cooperative breeder Neolamprologus pulcher, we experimentally engineered the ability of subordinates to contribute to alloparental care by manipulating two different helping behaviours independently from one another in a full factorial design. We recorded the treatment effects on breeder aggression, subordinate helping efforts and submissive displays. We found two divergent regulatory mechanisms of cooperation, dependent on behavioural function. Experimental impediment of territory maintenance of subordinates triggered punishment by dominants, whereas prevented defence against egg predators released a compensatory response of subordinates without any enforcement, suggesting pre-emptive appeasement. These effects occurred independently of one another. Apparently, in the complex negotiation process among members of cooperative groups, behaviours fulfilling different functions may be regulated by divergent interaction mechanisms

Nachbauprobleme bei Apfelkulturen

Bei wiederholtem Anbau von Obstbäumen am gleichen Standort wird häufig verminderter Wuchs und reduzierter Ertrag beobachtet. Dieses Phänomen wird als Nachbauproblem oder Bodenmüdigkeit bezeichnet. Auch Schweizer Apfelproduzenten sind davon betroffen. Die ACW untersucht mögliche Ursachen

Conformist Preferences in Mixed-Motive Games

We examine a novel class of conformist preferences which falls within the realm of belief-dependent motivations in that the peers’ expectations about others’ behavior may affect every group-member’s welfare. Similar other-regarding motivations, like guilt-aversion, have been inferred from evidence of a belief-behavior correlation but the issue of causality has been disputed. In examining conformism we propose a design that verifies the presence of the relevant causality direction while ruling out alternative other-regarding motivations. Our data reveal “self-servingly conformist” behavior in that subjects choose to match their strategy to the peers’ expectations when it is in their interest to do so

Conformist Preferences in Mixed-Motive Games

We examine a novel class of conformist preferences which falls within the realm of belief-dependent motivations in that the peers’ expectations about others’ behavior may affect every group-member’s welfare. Similar other-regarding motivations, like guilt-aversion, have been inferred from evidence of a belief-behavior correlation but the issue of causality has been disputed. In examining conformism we propose a design that verifies the presence of the relevant causality direction while ruling out alternative other-regarding motivations. Our data reveal “self-servingly conformist” behavior in that subjects choose to match their strategy to the peers’ expectations when it is in their interest to do so